Preliminaries
Results
Future Work
$X = \{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$
$X = \{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
Solution $S = \{C_1, C_6\} = \{\{1,2,3\}, \{4,5,6\}\}$
PC-X3C instance $I$ has no solution$\iff$$G$ has a strictly popular outcome $\Box$
Equilibrium Concept | Room size | 3D-Euclidean Stable Roommates (3D-EuclidSR) |
---|---|---|
Popularity | $2$ | ? |
Strict Popularity | $3$ | co-NP-hard |
Strict Popularity | $> 3$ | ? |
Mixed Popularity | $\geq 3$ | ? |
Popularity | $\geq 3$ | ? |
[1] | Gärdenfors, P.: Match making: Assignments based on bilateral preferences. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 20, 166–173 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830200304, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bs.3830200304 |
[2] | Deineko, V. G., & Woeginger, G. J. (2013). Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 161(13-14), 1837-1842. |
[3] | Chen, J., & Roy, S. (2021). Multi-dimensional stable roommates in 2-dimensional Euclidean space. arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.03868. |
[4] | Di Battista, G., Liotta, G., & Vargiu, F. (1998). Spirality and optimal orthogonal drawings. SIAM Journal on Computing, 27(6), 1764-1811. |
Metric Space (Room size > 2) | |
Core Stability | NP-Complete |
2D-Euclidean Space (Room size > 2) | |
Core Stability | NP-Complete |